Quality Uncertainty and Grain Merchandising Risk: Vomitoxin in Spring Wheat by Diersen, Matthew A. et al.
Agricultural  Economics  Report No.  333
QUALITY  UNCERTAINTY  AND  GRAIN  MERCHANDISING  RISK:
VOMITOXIN  IN  SPRING WHEAT
D.  Demcey  Johnson,  William  W.  Wilson,  and Matthew Diersen
Department of Agricultural Economics  *  Agricultural Experiment Station
North Dakota  State University  *  Fargo,  ND  58105-5636
August  1995Table  of Contents
Page
List of Tables  ..........  ...............................................  ii
List of Figures  ........................................................ iii
Highlights  ..........................................................  v
Introduction  .......................................................  . 1
Background  . ........................................................  2
Related  Studies  ....................................................  2
Quality  D efinitions  ..................................................  3
Vomitoxin  .......................................................  4
Regulations  and Grades  ............................................  4
Vom itoxin Statistics  ..............................................  4
Trading, Handling  and Procurement  ...................................  7
Quality:  Contract Specifications  and Limits  ..............................  7
Public Issues  ....................................................  9
Model  Specification  . . . . ..........................................  11
Data Sources  and Base-Case  Parameters  .....................................  13
Quantity  and Quality Availability  ...........  ............................  13
Transportation  Costs  ................................................  13
Prices  and Discounts  ...............................................  14
Quality  Requirem ents  ...............................................  14
Sim ulation Results  ...................................................  15
Base  Case Results  .................................................  17
Normal  Crop Year Results  ...........................................  20
Results for  1994 Crop Year  ...........................................  22
Effects  of Means  and Variability  in Vomitoxin on Prices  .......................  23
M ean Level  ...................................................  24
Standard  Deviation  ..............................................  24
Domestic  Milling Strategies  Toward Vomitoxin  .............................  25
Discounting for Vomitoxin  ........................................  25
Domestic Vomitoxin  Specifications  ...................................  28
Analysis  of Importer Strategies  ........................................  28
Price Increase  .....  .............................................  29
Vomitoxin  Specification  ..........................................  29
Efficacy  of Stringent Damage  Specification  to Reduce  Vomitoxin  ...............  ..  29
Summ ary and Discussion  ...............................................  33











Wheat Supply  and Quality Attributes by  Region  1993  ...............
Wheat Supply  and Quality  Attributes by Region  1994  ..............
Correlations Among Quality  Characteristics,  1993  - 1994  Crop  Years  ....
Factor  and Nonfactor  Quality Requirements  at Principal  HRS Markets  . . .
Transportation  Cost,  $/bu ...................................
Base-case  Prices and Vomitoxin  Discounts  .......................
Contract  Specifications  ....................................
Selected Results From  Model  Simulations  .......................




.. . . . . 6
. . . . . . 8





.....  22List of Figures
No.  Page
1  Base  Case  Flows (mil. bu.)  ......................................  18
2  Normal Flows (mil.  bu.)  ........................................  21
3  '94  Flows (mil. bu.)  ............................................  23
4  Impact  of CRD5  Vomitoxin Distribution  on Shadow Price  (CRD5)  ...........  24
5  Impact of Domestic Miller's Vomitoxin Discount on Objective  Function  .......  26
6  Impact of Domestic Miller's Vomitoxin Discount on Flows  ................  26
7  Impacts of Domestic Miller's  Vomitoxin Discount on Vomitoxin  Level and
Probability of Satisfying  Contract  Requirement  .........................  27
8  Impact  of Domestic Miller's Vomitoxin  Specification  on Flows  .............  27
9  Impacts of Domestic Miller's Vomitoxin  Specification  on Vomitoxin  Level and
Probability of Satisfying  Contract  Requirement  .........................  28
10  Impact of Japan's Price on Flows  ..................................  .30
11  Impacts of Japan's Price  on Vomitoxin Level  and Probability  of Satisfying
Contract Requirement  ...........................................  30
12  Impacts of Japan's Vomitoxin Specification  on Flows  ...................  31
13  Impacts of Japan's Vomitoxin  Specification  on Vomitoxin  Level and Probability
of Satisfying  Contract Requirement  .................................  31
14  Impact of PNW Other Damage  Specification  on Vomitoxin  Level  ............  32
15  Response of Supply to PNW  Other  Damage  Specifications  .................  32
iiiHighlights
A  mathematical  programming  model is used developed to demonstrate implications of a
random quality  factor, vomitoxin, for spatial  flows and merchandising  risk.  The model is developed
from a seller's  perspective using crop quality and market data  from 1993 and 1994, years of severe
Vomitoxin infestations in the U.S. spring wheat crop.  Vomitoxin poses major risks for grain traders
because of regulatory  (FDA)  limits, sampling difficulties, and imprecise measurement.  If a shipment is
rejected because of excess vomitoxin, it must be sold at a reduced  price to an alternative buyer.  These
implicit discounts influence precautionary  efforts by sellers to ensure that contract specifications are
satisfied.
The model is structured  as a blending  problem.  There are nine wheat supply regions, each
with different quality attributes. Seven contracts are used by specific buyers with delivery to or
through Minneapolis or the Pacific Northwest (PNW),  each with different prices and quality
requirements.  The  objective is to maximize the value of wheat sales net of transportation  costs.
Inclusion of a random quality factor, vomitoxin, complicates the analysis.  The distribution  of
vomitoxin (mean and variance) varies geographically  as well as between crop years.  Traders can
assemble grain  from different regions and, through blending, influence the probability that shipments
will receive the full price, avoiding discounts  for excess vomitoxin.  Relationships among these
endogenous probabilities,  market price spreads, and contract specifications are of central interest in
model simulations.
Following are some of the major  findings:
Vomitoxin disrupted "normal"  spatial  flow patterns in 1993, according  to results of base case
simulations. Large amounts of wheat  from eastern crop reporting  districts were exported via
the PNW, while wheat from the western and central districts was sold to domestic millers and
shipped east.  The failure of selected PNW buyers to specify contract limits for vomitoxin was
critical  to this  flow pattern.
A  comparison of alternative  simulations suggests that vomitoxin (and associatedprice
discounts) lowered the value of North Dakota wheat production by about $86 million in 1993.
This is in addition to the value of yield losses sustained that year.  Impacts were largest in
eastern districts,  where vomitoxin was especially severe.
Merchandisers  must be concerned with the distribution of vomitoxin in purchased  grain.  When
vomitoxin levels are subject to greater uncertainty (i.e.,  have larger  variances), the seller
incurs larger  risks of rejected shipments.  To illustrate the significance of different levels of
mean and variance, the model was simulated with a range of values in an individual crop
district. Results confirm that wheat values  at points of origin (i.e., prices received by
producers) are inversely related to both the mean and variance of vomitoxin.
*  Buyers of wheat compete against one another not only on the basis of pirce, but through
quality specifications. Specifying abnormally tight requirements, not matched by competing
contracts, should reduce the geographical  region in which a  buyer is competitive.  However, in
the context of our model, with multiple quality  factors and competing contracts, the effects of
contract tightening are not always easy to anticipate.
VQUALITY  UNCERTAINTY  AND  GRAIN MERCHANDISING  RISK:
VOMITOXIN  IN  SPRING  WHEAT*
D.  Demcey Johnson, William W. Wilson,  and Matthew  Diersen**
INTRODUCTION
In  many grain markets, price relationships, merchandising  strategies  and spatial flows are
heavily  influenced  by quality factors.  Foreign and domestic end-users of grain have  diverse quality
requirements.  Supplies of quality characteristics  are heterogeneous,  varying  by producing  region and
through  time, depending on conditions  in individual  crop  years.  Heterogeneity  in supply and demand
for characteristics  is a critical  feature of grain handling  and merchandising.  Elevators  segregate  grain
based  on quality factors  (such  as protein  or test weight)  and enhance  their marketing margins through
blending  and conditioning  activities.  Traders  assemble  grain from  different  producing regions, with
different  quality characteristics,  to satisfy needs of individual  buyers and to capture  price  premiums.
However,  quality variability  creates uncertainty  and risks,  a fact that is well recognized  among
grain merchandisers.  Interest on this topic was heightened by recent  experiences  in the spring wheat
and barley  markets.  In  1993  and  1994,  weather conditions led to severe  quality problems  for spring-
planted  grains.  Vomitoxin  (aka deoxynivalenol),  a toxic  substance of mold origin  (and subject to food
safety regulations),  was detected  in high concentrations  in some growing  regions.  Vomitoxin  is an
example of a quality  characteristic  that cannot easily be controlled  by contract specifications  due to
sampling and measurement  error.  The distribution of vomitoxin  also varies both geographically  and
through time.  Such  characteristics  increase  risks for grain traders  and complicate  procurement
strategies for  domestic and international  buyers.
Grain  traders make  sales on the basis of contract specifications  for quality  characteristics.
When  individual  characteristics  are subject to large  sampling or measurement  error, they are viewed  as
random  from  a trading perspective.  This has implications  for merchandising  and procurement
strategies.  Grain  sellers weigh the probability  of not meeting contract specifications  (and associated
price risks)  when assembling grain  before shipment.  If, after shipment and inspection  at a destination,
the grain fails to meet the buyer's quality  specifications,  it may be discounted or (in the case of
vomitoxin)  forced to be sold to an  alternative  market at a lower price.  The magnitude  of this penalty
will influence  precautionary  efforts  by sellers i.e.,  decisions about  sourcing of grain,  and  levels of
quality characteristics  before  shipment, to ensure that contract  specifications  are satisfied.  Price
effects  (premiums  or discounts) are transmitted  to country  origins  as traders shift their procurement  in
response to quality risks and changing price  relationships among  contracts  and markets.
*This project was supported  under  USDA/CSRS  Agreement No. 91-34192-6204  titled "Economic
Growth via Exports  of Northern  Plains Agricultural  Products,  " Agricultural  Experiment  Station, North
Dakota  State University, Fargo.  Constructive  comments were received  from  G.  Flaskerud, J. Krause,
V. Satyanarayana  and W. Moore. However,  errors  and  omissions remain the responsibility of the
authors.
**Assistant professor,  professor,  and graduate  student, respectively,  in the Department  of Agricultural
Economics, North  Dakota State University, Fargo.Quality variability  (uncertainty)  creates  numerous problems  for end-users.  Both the Office  of
Technology  Assessment (U.S.  Congress) and  USDA studies (Mercier)  on grain  quality concluded that
quality variability  is a growing  concern  among  importers.  Because of the growing  sophistication  of
buyers  and competition  in the international  and domestic  grain  market, there  is a trend toward greater
specificity  in contract  terms.  As contracts  become more specific,  buyers'  procurement  costs increase.
In addition,  procurement  becomes more restricted  geographically  due to competitive  pressures  and
restricted  availability of specific qualities.
Importer procurement  strategies  i.e.,  the combinations  of price and quality specificity,  are
critical  factors  in the spring  wheat market.  Some  importers  use more stringent contract specifications
than  U.  S.  domestic millers.  The  latter are  accustomed to mixing and blending and  can target specific
producing regions  for their wheat procurement.  Contract specifications  have considerable  strategic
importance,  particularly  in view of competition  among buyers.  As quality specifications  become more
restrictive,  procurement  becomes more difficult;  higher prices  must be bid to meet volume
requirements.
These problems  are not unique to wheat and vomitoxin.  Similar problems  exist with aflatoxin
in corn  and vomitoxin  in barley  (Wheeler).  With growing  awareness of food safety  issues and
increasing  buyer sophistication,  it has become  increasingly  important to integrate  effects of quality
variability  into  economic and strategic analyses of trade and procurement.  As demonstrated  in this
report,  the value of wheat  in different  geographical  locations varies substantially with both the level
and variability  of quality characteristics,  as well  as with other parameters  (e.g.,  price differentials  and
transportation  costs) traditionally associated with spatial equilibrium.
The  purpose of this report  is to analyze effects  of quality variability on the allocation of wheat
among  competing markets  and contracts.  The focus  is on quality variability,  trading risks, and
competition  among buyers offering  different prices  and contract  terms.  The primary  quality
characteristic  of interest  is vomitoxin,  which had  important  effects  on the upper  great plains wheat and
barley  markets during  1993  and  1994.  However,  the analysis requires  consideration  of other quality
characteristics  relevant to wheat  buyers.  A math programming  model  was developed to incorporate
the spatial dimensions of quality distributions,  competing  geographic  market demands,  and contract
requirements  and premiums/discounts  for  specific buyers.  The model was used to evaluate  the effect
of quality variability  and alternative  buyer strategies on trade patterns  and  merchandising  risk.
BACKGROUND
Related  Studies.  Policymakers,  grain trading firms and agencies,  and agricultural  economists
have analyzed  issues related  to grain  quality.  This  reflects the increased perception  of quality as an
important  factor  in trade  and competition.  Some of the issues identified  in this report were addressed
in  earlier  studies.  Waugh analyzed  Canadian  wheat  samples to evaluate  effects of grade factors  on
end-use  performance.  Hyslop analyzed the effect of grade factor  levels and location  on the value  of
wheat.  They confirmed  that location  was an  important  factor  determining  the value  of individual
wheat  lots.
There  have been numerous  studies related  on grain  quality with  several  evolving strains  of
literature.  One  analyzed the extent  and effect  of differentiation  in the world wheat trade.  These
include  studies by Larue  and Lapan;  Veeman;  Wilson and  Gallagher;  Wilson  (1989,  1994);  and Wilson
2and Preszler.  Mercier  analyzed  the role  of quality in wheat import  decisions,  based on results from  a
survey of international  buyers.  Johnson and  Wilson (1995)  developed  an optimization  model  that
simultaneously  determined  the importer's  demand  for quality attributes  (in  this case, cleaned  wheat)
and the exporter's  supply of cleaned wheat.
Other studies have addressed issues related to the role  of institutions affecting  quality
heterogeneity.  These include  the Office  of Technology  Assessment (U.S. Congress) and Hill.  Recent
research  has begun to examine the economics of conditioning  grain and  the role  of market and
regulatory mechanisms in  providing  incentives.  These include  studies on wheat  cleaning by Adam,
Kenkel,  and Anderson; Fridirici,  Kiser,  Schnake  and Wingfield;  USDA  studies (summarized  by Lin
and  Leath; Mercier  and Hyberg;  and  Hyberg et al.);  and Wilson,  Scherping,  Johnson,  and Cobia.
Johnson and Wilson  (1993)  developed  a blending model  with integrated  cleaning technology  at the
country elevator  level.
A recurring  theme  in these studies has been the importance  of quality variability.  The OTA
study found that grain  buyers wanted more information  on end-use performance  and had major
concerns  about the lack of uniformity  in quality.  The USDA  survey (summarized  in Mercier)  of
buyers  indicated  that wheat from  both Australia  and  Canada was superior  to U.S.  in terms of quality
variability  and cleanliness.  Concerns were  raised about quality variability both within and between
shipments (Mercier  and  Hyberg).  To date,  much of the U.S.  research has  focused on quality  levels,
rather than  quality variability,  even  though both the level  and variability  are critical  in  commercial
processing.
1,2  This problem  was analyzed  in the case of end-use performance  variability by Wilson
and Preszler.  Their  study uses a chance-constrained  programming  model  to assess impacts of quality
variability  on wheat imports  in the United  Kingdom.
Quality Definitions.  Wheat  quality is conventionally  described  in terms  of grade-determining
and nongrade-determining  factors.  The former  are easily measured  and have standardized  procedures
for  evaluation.  Grade-determining  factors  affect  the grade number assigned to particular  samples using
the least-factor  approach.
Nongrade-determining  quality factors  are also  important to end-users  but do not affect the
grades.  Of particular  importance  in the case of wheat are  protein, dockage,  falling numbers,  sprout
damage,  vitreous kernels,  and vomitoxin.  Protein  is a proxy for gluten  strength,  and dockage  is a
measure of the amount of "easily removable"  nonwheat material  in a sample.
Vitreous  kernels  (measured  in  %) relates to the hard,  glossy appearance of wheat and usually
varies with protein content.  It is judged  visually by comparing wheat  samples with known  standards
under a constant  light source.  Sub-classes  of Hard  Red  Spring (HRS)  wheat  are determined  on the
basis of vitreous kernels.  Falling number is a test for  potential  sprout damage,  or premature
germination.  Technically,  it is the number of seconds required  for a plunger to fall  a measured
distance through  a heated water and flour mixture.  Higher falling number values indicate  low  alpha-
amylase activity (i.e.,  sounder wheat).
lIn particular,  large variations in  quality can interrupt production  schedules,  increase  processing  costs,
require  additional  storage,  and reduce  end-product  quality.
2In large  part, total quality management is motivated by the  objective  of reducing quality
variability.
3Vomitoxin.  Sprouting of wheat has been  a problem  throughout the world wheat economy  for
many years.  Untimely rains  before harvest may induce sprouting of kernels.  Wahl and O'Rourke
reported  that in some regions  of the world,  sprouting may occur from  3 (Canada,  United Kingdom,
Germany,  and Finland)  to 7 (Poland,  Sweden,  and  Japan) years out of  10.  Other areas  commonly
affected by  sprout include the U.S.  Pacific Northwest  and Northeast.  Their  simulation results (using
the USDA  SWOPSIM model)  demonstrated that overall  producer revenues  decrease  by 4 to  10%  in
the United  States because of sprouting.
Growing  conditions during  1993  and  1994  gave  rise to scab infestations in  spring-planted
grains.  Vomitoxin  is an undesirable characteristic  which became a major factor  in the spring wheat
and barley markets. 3  This section defines  vomitoxin and explains  its treatment in regulations.
Impacts  of vomitoxin on grain  merchandising and  procurement  are also described.
Regulations and Grades: Vomitoxin  is a non-carcinogenic  fusarium mycotoxin  also known as
DON, an  acronym  for  "deoxynivalenol"  (National Grain and Feed  Association,  p.  1).  Unlike  some
toxins,  it generally  "does not  represent a threat  to public health  among the general  population,  ... [but]
sometimes produces  acute temporary  nausea and vomiting  in humans and  animals"  (Milling  and
Baking News, p.  11).  Vomitoxin  is a by-product  of fusarium  graminearum  or  scab (Moore,  p. 3).
Scab kernels  are counted  as damaged  in U.S.  grade  standards but inference  to vomitoxin is not
made.  Thus, vomitoxin is measured  indirectly in U.S. grade  standards.  It is also regulated for  safety
reasons  by the Food and  Drug Administration  (FDA).  Although vomitoxin can be present  in scabbed
kernels, the presence  of scab does not mean that vomitoxin is present.  Nor does the scab kernel  count
give an  accurate  measure of the extent of vomitoxin.  The Neogin  (brand)  ELISA  test is widely used
to measure vomitoxin.  This test measures vomitoxin in ranges  but is not highly accurate.  More
advanced testing methods  provide  a precise and  accurate measurement  (and are the methods used in
this study).  The drawback  is their higher expense as a testing procedure.
The  FDA treats vomitoxin at an "advisory  level,"  meaning  it is not  subject to mandatory
limits.  However,  the agency reserves  the right to take regulatory  action against persons who
knowingly  blend grain  containing  vomitoxin with clean grain--if the resulting mixture  is likely to
result in  an end-product  that significantly  exceeds the advisory  level  necessary to protect human and
animal  health (NGFA,  p.  5).
The  previous vomitoxin advisory  level was established in  1982  and was set at 2 ppm for raw
grains,  1 ppm for products, and 4 ppm for feed.  These were changed  in September  1993  as follows:
the limit on raw grains was eliminated;  product  limits were retained  at  1 ppm;  and there was a change
in  advisory  level for feed,  with different  limits for individual  species.
Vomitoxin Statistics:  The  level and  variability  of vomitoxin  among North  Dakota Crop
Reporting  Districts (CRDs) are shown  in Tables  1 and 2  for the  1993  and  1994 crops.  Vomitoxin
levels  in  several regions  had averages greater  than the FDA  advisory levels, particularly  those in the
eastern  region (CRDs 3,  6,  and 9).  There  was substantial variability both across and within CRDs.  A
comparison  between years shows that vomitoxin was more extensive  in  1993.
3The technical  and agronomic  aspects of vomitoxin have been the subject of numerous  analysis.  See
Minnesota Wheat Research  and Promotion Council,  1993  and  1994,  for a summary of this research.
4Table 1.  Wheat Supply and Quality  Attributes by  Region  1993t
ND Crop  Nonrandom  factors  Vomitoxin
Reporting
District  Q  PRO  TW  SB  DK  FM  DAM  VIT  FN  p  a
CRD  1  35.7  13.0  60.23  1.06  1.47  0.39  0.30  84  341  0.22  0.06
CRD 2  27.8  14.6  58.63  0.75  1.68  0.15  1.10  79  362  0.65  0.69
CRD 3  40.7  14.8  55.20  1.11  1.67  0.24  4.29  69  348  4.65  2.58
CRD 4  22.4  13.8  60.02  1.15  1.21  0.04  0.54  75  379  0.33  0.30
CRD 5  32.6  14.0  58.69  1.08  1.84  0.08  1.04  70  357  1.54  2.31
CRD 6  35.7  15.0  55.95  1.35  2.40  0.12  5.44  79  398  7.35  4.00
CRD 7  27.5  14.2  59.32  1.56  3.24  0.02  0.68  83  380  0.30  0.26
CRD 8  19.9  13.9  58.94  1.44  1.57  0.03  0.80  72  379  0.96  0.84
CRD 9  32.0  14.1  57.49  1.15  2.03  0.01  3.14  79  409  6.58  3.33
t  Q:  quantity (mil.  bu);  PRO:  protein  (%);  TW:  test weight (lbs/bu);  SB: shrunken  and broken  kernels  (%);  DK: dockage  (%);  FM: foreign
material  (%);  DAM:  damage  (%);  VIT:  vitreous  kernels  (%);  FN: falling number;  i:  mean parts per million;  a:  standard deviation.  Defects
are the sum of SB,  FM, and  DAM.
(1Table 2.  Wheat Supply  and Quality  Attributes by Region  1994
ND Crop  Nonrandom  Factors  1994  Vomitoxin
Reporting












































































































1.23The  standard deviation  of vomitoxin in the samples increases  with mean  levels.  Where
vomitoxin  is more prevalent,  it is subject to greater  uncertainty.  Incidences of vomitoxin  have been
highly  uneven.  The average  level of vomitoxin (weighted by production  in nine CRD's) was 2.84
ppm  in  1993.  Ignoring  CRDs 3, 6,  and 9,  (eastern North Dakota) the weighted  average  was only 0.67.
Data from  crop  quality surveys  suggested vomitoxin  is positively correlated  with damage,
defects,  and test weight (Table  3).  To control the level of vomitoxin,  a buyer  could use specifications
for  other,  more easily measurable  characteristics.  For example,  tighter  specifications  on damage  or
defects  would be expected to have  an impact  on the level of vomitoxin  in purchased  grain.
Trading, Handling and Procurement: The existence of contract  specification  and regulatory
limits for vomitoxin induced a response by the trading  and handling  industry.  The  Minneapolis  Grain
Exchange,  the principal  futures  contract for HRS wheat, requires  deliveries  to be  "fit for  human
consumption," which  was interpreted  to mean  in conformance  with FDA regulations.  Domestic food
processors  initially established contract  limits at 2 ppm, which were  subsequently  replaced by limits
for vomitoxin  in the product.
Importers  of HRS  had varying  responses; however,  most instituted new contract  specifications.
Alternative  measures of Vomitoxin  were used by importers  shipping from the Pacific Northwest
(PNW).  Japan  initially adopted  a "scab-free"  specification,  defined  as no scab-infected  kernels using
FGIS  analysis.  Presumably,  scab free  was considered  equivalent  to vomitoxin free.  Vomitoxin was
not easily testable until the FGIS tests were announced.  Other importers  adapted varying  levels of
vomitoxin  in their specification,  or used a more  stringent specification  for damage.
In this market  environment  substantial price discounts emerged  for vomitoxin-infected  wheat.
Even after  the September  1993  FDA announcement,  traders  remained concerned  about the potential
reaction  of customers to high levels of vomitoxin.  Discounts were  particularly  severe  at points of
origination.4  This was due partly to the lack of a quick test for vomitoxin.  As an alternative  practical
approach,  many buyers chose to purchase grain  from  locations with low reported  levels of vomitoxin,
i.e.,  the western  CRDs of North  Dakota.
Discounts were  largest  in the immediate post-harvest period  for the  1993  crop, but abated
somewhat with the promulgation  of new FDA regulations.  Japan paid  up to 27c/b  ($10/mt)  for scab-
free wheat (Oades).  The highest  discount for vomitoxin was $1/b;  this was reduced to 65c/b  and
eventually  40 to  50c/b (terminal  discounts) for vomitoxin greater  than 4 ppm (Milling  and Baking
News,  Sept. 21,  1993).  Discounts at country  locations  in North Dakota were  20c/b for Vomitoxin
greater than  2 ppm (Flaskerud).
Quality: Contract  Specifications and Limits.  Data were  collected  on the specifications  required
by principal  HRS  buyers  in the two principal  geographic  markets for this type of wheat:  Minneapolis
and PNW (See  Table 4).  The  Minneapolis market comprises  four  contractually  different  segments,
which  are representative  of most eastbound shipments of wheat from North  Dakota.5  The  milling
contract  (hereafter  referred  as domestic milling) is that generally used by millers  located  in and
4Pedrazza  (Aug.  15,  1994).
5Minneapolis  is the  destination or transit point for about 50%  of the HRS  crop.
7Table 3.  Correlations Among  Quality Characteristics,  1993 - 1994 Crop Years
1993 Crop Year
SB  FM  DAM  DEF  TWT  DOC  PRO  FN  VIT  VOM
SB  .01  .04  .37*  -.17*  .23*  -.17*  -.06  -.07  .02
FM  -.01  .23*  -.05  .20*  -.24  .01  -.05  -.02
DAM  .91*  -.69*  .24*  .32*  -.01  -.21*  .79*
DEF  -.69*  .34*  .17*  -.02  -.21*  .72*
TWT  -.33*  -.35*  .09  .24*  -.56*
DOC  .01  -.02  -.01  .17*
PRO  .01  .24*  .25*
FN  .23*  .24*
VIT  .03
1994 Crop Year
SB  -0.2  .13  .46*  -.19*  .21*  -.15*  -.12  -.09  .23*
FM  .08  .26*  -.07  .21*  .13  -.06  .02  .39*
DAM  .92*  -.78*  .10  .28*  -.25*  -.46*  -.68*
DEF  -.75*  .20*  .21*  -.26  -.42*  .67*
TWT  -.30*  -.36*  .23*  .45*  -.47*
DOC  -.04  -.02  -.11  -.15
PRO  .03  .30*  .17
FN  .36*  -.25*
VIT  -.31
* Significantly  different  from  zero.
** The Vomitoxin correlations  are  only for CRDs 3, 6,  and  9.
8beyond  Minneapolis.  Domestic markets trade basis  14%  protein, but  individual transactions may
deviate and are  subject to premium/discount  schedules.  There  are two contracts  specified  for Terminal
wheat, distinguished only by levels  of falling number and vomitoxin.  These  specifications  are
representative  of HRS  wheat exports  from  either Duluth/Superior  or from  the U.S.  Gulf (which  are
priced  basis Minneapolis).
There  are  several  large  buyers  of HRS at the PNW,  each with unique quality  specifications.
Although  Japan  specifies Grade  No. 2,  some of its factor limits call for higher quality.  Most
interesting  are the  limits on heat damage and the use of "scab-free,"  which implies  zero tolerance for
vomitoxin.  Other countries  specified  vomitoxin at 2 ppm, consistent with previous  FDA limits,  or
omitted a vomitoxin  specification.  Sprout-damage  in  each of the contracts  is specified  at 0.5%
(maximum).  This is the predominant  type of damage  in the grade  standards, and sprout damage  was
the precursor  measurement to the Falling Number test.6  Korea and Taiwan each  explicitly specify No.
1, 14.5%  protein and differ  only in the value of vitreous kernels and falling number.  Thailand  and
Philippines  each require  No.  2 grade  specifications,  with Thailand  requiring  15%  protein.
Philippines'  specifications  are generally  looser and similar to those of other HRS buyers off the PNW.
Similar information  for these importers was collected  for  1994 and used in one of the simulations.7
Public Issues: A great deal of public attention  was focused on problems associated  with
vomitoxin (North Dakota  State Wheat Commission).  During  1993,  an estimated 90 million bushels
were  lost from  North Dakota's  HRS crop  harvest.  A similar problem,  though not as severe,  occurred
in  1994 with  estimated losses at 36 million bushels.
The U.S.  General  Accounting  Office  (U.S.GAO)  initiated an  investigation over pricing
practices.  The request was to determine  "why producers  in these states were  forced  to accept  steep
and inconsistent discounts in prices  paid for their commodities..."  (U.S.GAO).  "Grain buyers  applied
higher discounts for  vomitoxin-contaminated  grain  to compensate  for this risk"  (p.,  4).  The  study
reported  that high vomitoxin  levels (p. 3) that may  have been the result of biased sampling,  as farmers
and elevators  chose to test grain they already  suspected was contaminated.8
6There  is no  specific factor  limit for sprout  damage in the standards;  it is simply a component of total
damage.
7Contract  requirements were  identical with the following exceptions:  Korea's  falling number
specification was  reduced to 330;  and, dockage  was specified  as 0.8  for Japan  and Philippines,  0.7  for
Taiwan,  and  1.0 for Korea  and Thailand.  These contracts  were  on an all dockage-deductible  basis,
with Japan allowing  0.5  dockage  before  deduction.
8The testing measure  was  the ELISA test which only reports a range (Moore,  personal
communication).
9Table 4.  Factor and Nonfactor  Quality Requirements  at Principal HRS Markets9' 10
MINNEAPOLIS  MARKETS  PACIFIC NORTHWEST EXPORT MARKETS

































































































































9Figures  shown are normal,  or conventional,  specifications.  Those  shown in zero  indicates values adapted for  1993.
'0Besides these the PNW export market has  specific  specifications  for ergot,  moisture, and  treated  seeds.
"ob  and  ow  stand for "or better"  and  "or worse,"  respectively.MODEL SPECIFICATION
The  analytical  model has features  in  common with other blending problems. 12  Grain  supplies
are  allocated to nine regions, each with different  quality characteristics.  The model  includes  seven
buyer  contracts,  each with different  quality requirements.  Grain  can be assembled and blended  from
different  origins to attain  desired  levels of particular  characteristics.  Prices in terminal  markets are
taken as fixed along with transport  costs.  The objective  is to maximize  expected  sales revenue net of
transportation  costs, subject to grain availability  and  quality constraints.
Inclusion of a random  quality factor,  vomitoxin,  complicates the analysis.  More than  other
grain quality  factors,  vomitoxin is subject to sampling and  measurement  error.  As a result,
merchandisers  can only expect to meet contract  limits (e.g.,  no more than  2 ppm  for domestic millers)
in a probabilistic  sense.  If a shipment to a domestic or export  customer is rejected because of excess
vomitoxin, that wheat must be  sold under  an alternative  contract with less stringent requirements  at a
reduced  price.  The price spread  between  "primary"  and "secondary"  contracts  is equivalent to a
discount for vomitoxin.  The magnitudes  of discounts and  probabilities  of avoiding discounts in
different  contracts  are central  features  of the merchandising problem.
Other  studies have incorporated  "chance constraints"  in blending models (Wilson  and Preszler;
St. Pierre  and Harvey).  In those studies,  qualities of ingredients  are  random,  but the "blend" must
satisfy quality constraints  with a specified  probability.  Formulation  of our model is somewhat
different.  Probabilities of satisfying  vomitoxin constraints  (i.e.,  maximum  parts per million)  are
endogenous and embedded  in the objective  function,  rather than  entered  as constraint constants.
Bid prices  in terminal markets  are taken as exogenous.  This  is unlike other formulations  of
spatial equilibrium  problems, which treat demand  quantities as fixed  or (alternatively)  specify demand
functions  for individual  markets.  Given the focus of our analysis (i.e.,  on grain  quality attributes  and
buyer  specifications)  and limitations of available  data, it was not possible to estimate demand
schedules for the market segments (buyers)  represented  in our model.  Fixed (bid)  prices  in terminal
markets  imply perfectly  elastic demand,  a reasonable  assumption if the object is to model decisions by
traders (grain  buyers and sellers)  in a competitive  environment.
Formally, the objective  is to maximize
7  9  7
Z  =  [P, - DvI (1-(3)]NWi  - Xi  TXji  (1)
i=1  j=1  i=1
12Applications  in the case of grain  include  Schrueben;  Wilson and Preszler;  and Johnson  and Wilson
(1993).
11where  Pi  is the price bid ($bu)  by buyer  i; D'  is a price discount'"  ($/bu)  for vomitoxin;  ,i is the
probability  that the contract  limit for vomitoxin is satisfied; NW, is the net weight of wheat shipments
(mil.  bu) to buyer  i;  Xji  is a shipment of wheat (mil. bu) from  producing region j to buyer  i; and TXji
is the associated freight  cost ($/bu).  The bracketed  term represents  expected  price for  sales to buyer
i.14  Z is the expected net revenue  from  the sale of the crop.
Different contract  limits  and price discounts  are specified  for different  buyers.  In two cases,
i.e., Minneapolis feed and PNW Other, no vomitoxin  limit is specified,  and the vomitoxin discount is
zero.  For sales to other buyers, expected  revenue  depends  on the probability that the level  of
vomitoxin  is less than  a specified  maximum.  The larger  is  i•, the lower is the probability that
vomitoxin will  exceed the contract  limit, causing  a discount to  be applied  (i.e.,  to be  sold on a
different  contract).
Grain origins,  indexed by j, are identified  with North Dakota crop-reporting  districts.  Within
each CRD, vomitoxin  is treated  as a random  variable with known mean and variance.  These
parameters  vary by CRD; hence,  the probabilities of satisfying  contract  limits are influenced  by the
"weights" of different  CRDs in  grain  shipped to terminal  buyers.
Various quality measurements  are based on weight net of dockage.  Let Nji  denote the net
weight of a shipment from  region j to buyer i, defined
Nj,  =  XJi(100  - DK)/100
(2)
where  DKj is the level of dockage  (%)  in region j wheat.  Aggregating  across producing regions,
the total net weight of shipments to individual  buyers is
9
NW  =  Ni  (i=1,...,7)  (3)
j=i
Let wj,  denote the weight of region j  in shipments to buyer i:
Wji  =  Nji/NWi  (4)
The probability  of satisfying  an individual  contract's vomitoxin constraint  is based on the normal  cdf:
6i
S  =  - (2  -(1/2)e  du  (5)
i  (2n)1/2
'3The  discount, Dy  could represent  the difference  between Pi and  the price  in a secondary  market.  For
example,  if wheat is shipped to Minneapolis Milling but (at delivery)  is found to have excess
vomitoxin,  it must be sold  at the lower, Terminal 6 ppm price.
14The  expected  price depends  on Pi and  is therefore  endogenous.
12where  bi  is given  by
Vi  - E~tI  Wji
i  =  j  (6)
The  mean and variance of vomitoxin producing region j  are denoted tj and  aj2  , respectively,  and vi  is
the maximum  allowed  level of vomitoxin (without price discount).
Quality  characteristics  other than vomitoxin are treated  as nonrandom.  In practice,  these are
more easily measured  and  incorporated  in contracts.  Levels  of protein  or test weight are  assigned to
individual CRDs.  All  buyers,  except in the  feed  markets,  specify minimum  levels of protein,  test
weight,  vitreous kernels,  and falling number.  Maximum constraints  apply to shrunken  and broken
kernels,  foreign  material,  damage,  and defects.  Protein requirements  vary  across  buyers.
SNji-  PROj  /NWi  KPROi
(7)
where PROj  is the protein  level  (%)  in  producing region j, and KPROi  is the minimum protein
requirement  (%)  of buyer  i.  Constraints  for other quality factors  have the same general  form.
Finally,  supply  constraints  are  imposed in each of the producing regions.
E  ji  <Qj  (j=1,...,9)  (8)
i
where  Qj  is the total quantity  (mil. bu)  available  for shipping from  region j.
DATA  SOURCES  AND  BASE-CASE  PARAMETERS
This section describes  data sources  and  explains how base-case parameters  were  derived.  Most
simulations  use data from  the 1993  crop  year,  which  was characterized  by a severe  vomitoxin
problem,  particularly  in eastern North  Dakota.  For comparison,  an additional  simulation was
conducted  using market conditions  and  quality distributions from  1994.
Quantity and Quality Availability.  Mean values  of quality characteristics  were derived
from  data collected  as part of the  annual wheat quality survey  by the Department of Cereal  Chemistry
and Technology,  North Dakota State University.  Samples were taken  from  each of the CRDs, and
each  wheat quality  characteristic  was measured.  Wheat  quantities produced  in each CRD were taken
from  North  Dakota Agricultural  Statistics Service  (1994-1995).  These are the data shown in Tables  1
and 2.  These  CRDs accounted  for  54% of total HRS  production  in the United  States  in  1993.
Transportation Costs.  All shipments were  assumed to move by rail,  which  is the
predominant  mode to each  of these market destinations.  Rail rates  were those in effect  during the fall
of 1993  (Table  5) for 26  car movements.
13Prices and Discounts.  Prices are not regularly  reported  or publicly disseminated  for each of
these markets  and contracts.  Thus,  we constructed  prices using a series of spreads for  each of the
grades/qualities  used  in our analysis.  These were  collected  from  several  sources:  interviews  with
traders,  daily  price reports  from  each of the Minneapolis  Grain  Exchange  and  Portland  Grain
Exchange,  the USDA  price reporting  service  at each market,  and daily price sheets  from  a principal
cash grain  broker.
Table 5.  Transportation Costs,  $/bu
Destinations
Producing
Region  PNW  Minneapolis
CRD  1  1.19  0.78
CRD 2  1.23  0.67
CRD  3  1.26  0.52
CRD 4  1.11  0.73
CRD 5  1.26  0.53
CRD 6  1.26  0.5
CRD 7  1.1  0.7
CRD 8  1.19  0.62
CRD 9  1.26  0.42
Price spreads  were  combined with Minneapolis futures  prices  at corresponding  dates.  For the
1993  crop  year,  the time  period for these prices  extended from  August  1993 through April  1994.
Prices for the  1994  crop  year were  from  September to November  1994.  A simple average  was used
in each  case.  As shown  in Table  6,  the discounts  for Vomitoxin  were more  severe  in  1993  than  in
1994.
Quality Requirements.  Table  7 shows the quality requirements  for the contracts included  in
our  analysis.  We made two simplifying  assumptions about the treatment  of PNW contracts.  First,
PNW Other was  included to represent  all importers off the PNW coast besides Korea and Japan.  This
contract  was for No.  2,  14%  protein, with no vomitoxin specification,  and the price is generally
reported  by government  price reporting  services.  Second,  the Japan specification  for vomitoxin  was
set at 0.5 ppm  (maximum).  Technically,  that contract called  for "scab-free,"  which  is a proxy  for
vomitoxin-free.  Because we lacked  relevant  supply data on scab,  we specified  a vomitoxin  constraint
for Japan with a limit of 0.5  ppm.  Our treatment  is somewhat more  lenient than  Japan's actual
contract  specification.  However,  given the presence  of vomitoxin  in  all CRDs in  1993,  a zero-
vomitoxin  specification  would not have  been  feasible  in model  simulations.
14SIMULATION  RESULTS
The analytical  model was used to identify the optimal  solution and to evaluate  effects of
alternative  procurement  strategies.  Base case results using data  for  1993  are presented.  We then
examine the effect  of both the mean  level  and standard deviation  of vomitoxin on model results.  For
comparison,  a simulation with data from  1994  (i.e.,  quality distributions  and price  spreads)  is also
presented.  The remaining  simulations focus  on the effects  of alternative procurement  strategies by
principal  buyers.  These  entail adjustments  in prices  or changes in contract  requirements.
Table 6.  Base-case  Prices  and Vomitoxin  Discounts
1993  1994
Discount for  Discount for
Contract  Excess  Contract  Excess
Price  Vomitoxin  Price  Vomitoxin
Market/Contract  $/bu  $/bu  $/bu  $/bu
Minneapolis
Milling  5.36  .96 t  4.50  .25 t
Terminal,  2  ppm  5.05  .65  t  4.30  .05  t
Terminal,  6 ppm  4.4  1.59  4.25  1.20 $
Feed  2.81  n.a.  3.05  n.a.
PNW
Korea  6.08  .51  *  5.00  .10  *
Japan  5.74  .17  *  4.90  0  *
Other  5.57  n.a.  4.90  n.a.
n.a. not applicable.  f Alternative  market:  Minneapolis terminal,  6 ppm.
I  Alternative  market:  Minneapolis  feed.  * Alternative  market:  PNW Other.
Each  simulation  reveals the impacts on the value of North  Dakota wheat as reflected  in the
objective function,  which  measures expected sales revenue  net of transportation  costs.  Shadow prices
were  derived  to reflect the value of wheat  in each CRD.  These should be interpreted as values to
traders  at each origin,  ignoring  costs of assembly and blending (which  are non-observable).  Other
variables  of interest are the quantities  shipped to individual  markets,  average  levels of vomitoxin
received,  and probabilities  of satisfying contract  requirements.
15Table 7.  Contract  Specifications
TW  SB  FM  DAM  DEF  VIT  Vomitoxin
PRO  lbs/bu  %  %  %  %  %  FN  ppm
Contract  % (Min)  (Min)  (Max)  (Max)  (Max)  (Max)  (Min)  (Min)  (Max)
Minneapolis
Milling  14  58  3  .5  2  3  75  275  2
Terminal:  2 ppm  14  57  5  1  4  5  25  250  2
Terminal:  6 ppm  14  57  5  1  4  5  25  - 6
Feed
PNW
Korea  14.5  58  3  .5  2  3  25  350  2
Japan  14  57  5  1  2  5  25  300  .5
Other  14  57  5  1  4  5  25  - 6
--  not specified.A measure of risk was developed to compare alternative  contracts  from  a trader's  perspective.
Let EP,  denote  the expected price for  sales to buyer i.  This  is the bracketed  term  in (1),  a function  of
the vomitoxin  discount  Dy and  probability  of acceptance  fi.  Equivalently,  EPi  can be expressed  as
EPi  =  i'Pi  +  (1-Pi)'Si  (8)
where  (1-0i)  is the probability of rejection and  Si  is the price  in a secondary contract with  looser
vomitoxin specifications."  The standard  deviation of price  is defined  as
i  =  [i(Pi  - EPi)2  +  (1-i)(Si  - EPi)2]1/2  (9)
and the coefficient  of variation  is
CV,  - (10)
EP,
Following Barry  et al.  (pp.  320-21),  we use CVi  as a measure of risk,  in this case,  risk borne
by the seller when shipping  to buyer i.  Risk increases with the vomitoxin discount and  decreases
with the probability  of acceptance.
Base  Case Results.  Tables  8 and 9  show selected base case  results, with comparisons  to
other  scenarios.  The  objective  function value,  $1.216  billion,  is interpreted  as expected value of the
state's  HRS crop  if optimally blended  and shipped.  Base-case flows are  summarized  in Figure  1.
Flows are to the domestic milling market and to PNW Korea and PNW Other.  There  are no flows to
Japan  or other Minneapolis  markets.'6  The  pattern of flows (by CRD) also differs drastically  from
what might be  expected based on transportation  cots.  For example, Domestic Milling receives most of
its wheat from  western  CRDs, while part  of the Korean  contract  is supplied by eastern CRDs. This  is
due to the combined  effects  of quality availability,  quality requirements,  price spreads,  and discounts
for vomitoxin  in  different  contracts.  Flows to PNW Other are due to a relatively  high price  and no
vomitoxin  specification.
For the 3 contracts  receiving  grain, the quality constraints for vitreous kernels,  falling  number,
damage,  and defects  are not binding.  Protein  is binding for Domestic Milling and PNW Korea, while
test weight is binding  for PNW Other.
SRecall  that Dy  is the difference  between  prices  in "primary" and  "secondary"  markets.  Thus,
EP,  =  Pi.-P  +  (1-Pi)-Si  =  Pi.P,  +  (1-P,)Pi  - (1-Pi)Pi  +  (1-Pi)'Si
=  Pi  - (1-Pi)'(Pi  - Si)  =  Pi  - (1-1Pi).Dy
1 6For reference,  exports of HRS off the PNW during  1993/94 were Japan 45 million bushels; Korea  12
million; and Total  PNW  154 million.
17Minneapolis
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Figure  1.  Base Case Flows (mil. bu.)
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fvzl kilills  vu.jTable 8.  Selected  Results From Model  Simulations
Objective  Probability  of
Function  Expected  Value  Satisfying  Traders'  Risk
Simulation  ($ mil)  Quantity  (mil.  bu.)  Vomitoxin  Requirements  (CV)
Base Case
Normal  Year (No Vomitoxin,
Normal  Price Spreads)  *
1994  *





















































































*Some  flows are  omitted from table.
n/a not applicable.Expected  levels of vomitoxin  and probabilities  of satisfying  constraints are also shown in
Table  8.  For Domestic Milling and PNW Korea, expected  levels are well below contract  limits  (2
ppm).  The vomitoxin  level for PNW Other is relatively  high,  at 5.21  ppm; no vomitoxin limit is
specified  for that contract,  which functions  as the secondary  contract for  shipments to Korea and
Japan.
Probabilities  of satisfying vomitoxin  constraints vary across contracts.  These probabilities  are
determined  by the model  and should be interpreted  as optimal  from  a seller's  perspective,  given
relevant price  relationships  and the spatial distribution of quality.  In the case of Domestic Milling, the
probability  of satisfying the requirement  (2  ppm) is  .97.  This indicates  that it is optimal for traders to
ship wheat to Domestic Milling with a .03  probability  of not  satisfying contracts  requirements.
The  standard deviation  of vomitoxin in shipments under the Domestic Milling and PNW Korea
contracts  are  .18  and  .51,  respectively.  This indicates  greater  uncertainty  about vomitoxin  levels  in
shipments to the PNW Korea contract.  From  a seller's perspective,  the coefficient  of variation  (for
expected returns)  provides a more meaningful way to compare  relative risks.  As shown  in  Table  8,
the  CVi  for Domestic Milling is somewhat higher than that for PNW Korea in the base  case.  This is
largely  due to the difference  in vomitoxin discounts,  96 c/b  for Domestic Milling versus  51  c/b for
PNW Korea.  Given the higher penalty  for rejection,  the Domestic Milling contract  poses a greater
risk.  This induces  a greater  precaution  by traders  (lower mean  level of vomitoxin)  in  assembling grain
for  delivery to domestic millers.
Shadow prices  were derived  for each CRD  and are  shown in  Table  9.  These are  interpreted  as
the value of an additional bushel  in  each CRD,  given mean  quality characteristics.  The  results mirror
the wide disparity  in prices  actually observed  during  1993.  The value of an additional  bushel  in
regions with a high level of vomitoxin  (e.g.,  CRD 3,  6,  and 9)  is substantially lower than in
contiguous regions, with discounts above what would be expected  based on transport  costs.  Regions
with  low levels of vomitoxin (and  otherwise  better quality)  experience  higher prices  (e.g.,  CRD 2,  4,
7,  and 8).
Normal  Crop Year Results.  To  provide  a perspective  on what may occur  in a more  normal
year  we revised  the model parameters.  The term  "more normal"  is somewhat  elusive, but two changes
seemed in order.  Vomitoxin  was eliminated in  each region,  and  "more normal"  price relationships
were  assumed  in the Minneapolis  and PNW markets,  removing the (approximate)  impact of vomitoxin
on price  spreads.
One  of the peculiar  features  of the 1993  crop  year was the abnormally wide price  spreads
between  geographic  markets and between buyers  in the same market  (i.e.,  Minneapolis  or PNW).  To
evaluate  this impact, the model was run using price  and basis levels more typical  of these markets.
20Spreads and  basis values were taken  from  the  same time  interval  in  1992/93.'7  Vomitoxin  levels (and
variances)  were  reduced to zero  in each CRD,  but base case values  were retained  for other quality
parameters.
Flows under this scenario  are shown  in Figure  2.  Notable  differences  are the drastic
reductions  in flows  to Domestic Milling and PNW Other, which are  offset by  increases to Minneapolis
Terminal, PNW Korea, and PNW Japan.  These would be more representative  of a normal  year.  PNW
Korea is the  premium market.  Protein constraints  are binding for the Domestic Milling, PNW Korea,
and PNW Japan  contracts.  The overall  poor quality of wheat,  including  high damage  due to the
unusually cold,  wet growing  conditions of 1993,  constrains  flows  in all  markets.  The  probability of
satisfying requirements  increases  to  1 and risk decreases  to nil  (Table  8),  reflecting  the assumption  of
zero  vomitoxin.
PNW Minneapolis
Other  --  o0-10  mil.  bu.
S--  10-20  mil.  bu.
S20+  mil.  bu.
Normal Flows (mil.  bu.)
Figure  2.  Normal  Flows (mil. bu.)
17Contract  prices  were as follows: Domestic milling 5.35; Terminal 5.25; Minneapolis  feed 2.81; PNW
Korea 6.29; PNW Japan 5.95; PNW Other 5.85.
21Table 9.  Shadow Prices  for Individual  CRDs
Normal  Year,
No Vom.,  Zero Vom.  Damage 2%
Normal Price  CRD5  Vomitoxin  Discount  Max  for
CRD*  Base Case  Spreads  mean=0  var.=0  for Milling  PNW Other
1  449  455  438  439  475  510
4  474  484  468  468  485  510
7  475  480  471  472  474  492
2  489  531  490  489  487  530
5  431  476  494  478  486  467
8  469  472  465  463  482  487
3  411  461  417  417  426  313
6  412  453  415  415  391  254
9  423  475  421  421  429  365
*Crop  reporting districts  are arrayed  as a 3x3  grid.  The three western  districts (from  north to south
are  1, 4, and  7.  Central  districts are 2,  5, and  8.  Eastern districts are  3, 6,  and 9.
The  objective  function  value increases  by $86 million which  could be interpreted  as the impact
of vomitoxin  on the value of the wheat crop.  This may appear  low compared to other estimates, but the
difference  can be  explained by several  qualifications.  One  is that the analysis does not capture  anyyield
effects,  a notable  concurrent problem  with the incidence of vomitoxin.  Second, this analysis allows
wheat  to be  shipped to other markets  and  sold under alternative  contracts  which would have the effect  of
mitigating  some of the effects  of discounts.
Shadow prices  for individual  CRDs are shown  in Table 9.  The premium  in CRD2 reflects high
quality and protein and the proximity to PNW Korea.  The low value in  CRD1 reflects  a low average
protein level,  13  percent.  Low values in CRDs 3 and  6 are likely due to high damage.
Results for 1994 Crop Year.  For comparison,  simulations were conducted  with  1994 crop
quality data and market prices.  As shown  in Table 2, vomitoxin was also a significant problem  in the
eastern producing  regions,  particularly  CRD3  and CRD6.  Western  CRDs (1, 4,  and  7)  had virtually  no
vomitoxin  in  1994.18  Average protein  levels were higher  in regions with high vomitoxin,  a fact that
helps to explain the flow  patterns in model  simulations.
18In the  1994  crop year vomitoxin tests were not conducted  in CRDs  1, 4,  and 7 as part of the
wheat quality  survey.  Hence we  assumed that sample means  and variances  were  zero.
Sample  means in CRDs  2,  5,  and  8  were  based  on composite  samples.  In this case sample
variances for these  CRDs were not available  for  1994. For simulation purposes,  we predicted
the  standard deviations  for CRDs  2,  5, and 8 from a regression model with vomitoxin sample
means  from  1993  and  1994  as the explanatory  variable and sample  variances as the
independent variable.
22Selected results  are  shown  in  Table  8 and  flows  in Figure  3.  The  objective function  is $0.951
billion,  lower than  the base case due to substantially  lower prices.  Optimal  flows are to PNW Other
(157  million bu),  Domestic Milling (70  million bu),  and the Minneapolisfeed  market  (44  million bu).
The expected  vomitoxin  level for Domestic Milling is higher than  in the  base case, and the probability  of
satisfying requirements  is lower.  In  large part,  that is due to the coincidence  of high  Vomitoxin and
high protein  in CRDs 3, 6, and 9.  Other CRDs did not  have sufficiently  high protein  levels  to satisfy
contract specifications,  which are  binding for  both Domestic Milling and PNW Other.  This  forced  high-
vomitoxin  grain  into the solution  for these contracts.  The  results also demonstrate  that trader's  risk is
lower  in shipping to the Domestic Milling contract.
Effects  of Means  and Variability  in Vomitoxin  on Prices.  Both the mean  and variance  of
vomitoxin affect  regional wheat  prices  as well as spatial  flows.  Higher mean  values for vomitoxin affect
blending opportunities, just as they do for other quality characteristics.  Higher variances  can increase the
likelihood  that wheat shipments would be rejected  by buyers.
To  evaluate the relative  effects of changes  in the mean  and variance  of vomitoxin  on wheat
prices,  simulations were conducted  with different  distributions for vomitoxin  in one particular region.
CRD5 was chosen  for  demonstration purposes;  it is centrally located  and not extreme  in terms of its
vomitoxin  distribution.  The mean  level and variance  of vomitoxin  in this region  were  iterated  within
ranges  observed  in other regions.  Results are summarized  in terms of the impacts on  shadow price  for
CRD5.
PNW Minneapolis
---  - 0-10  mil.  bu.
---  10-20  mil.  bu.
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23Mean Level.  Lower mean  levels of vomitoxin  increase  the value  of wheat (Figure 4).  There
is  a large reduction  in  the shadow price  when vomitoxin  increases  from  0.3  to  1.2  ppm; thereafter,  the
impact on price diminishes.  An  increase  in  vomitoxin  from  0.1  to  1.0 ppm decreases  price  by  13c/b,
while an  increase  from  1.0 to  2.0 ppm  decreases  price by 4c/b.
Comparisons to the base case are  made in Table  7.  The effect on flows of reducing the mean
vomitoxin level  for  CRD5 to  zero  is shown.  The objective function  increases to $1.233  billion.  The
added value  reflects  a larger  flow to PNW Korea (19  mil.  bu. more than in the base case).  This
affects PNW Other, which  receives  19 million bu.  less than in the  base case and  with more vomitoxin.
The optimal probability of satisfying requirements  increases  slightly relative  to the base  case.
Twice the level  of wheat is supplied; however,  PNW Korea receives  the same expected  level  of
vomitoxin with the  same probability of satisfying  requirements.  Traders'  risk does not change  for the
PNW Korea market.  Elimination of vomitoxin  in CRD5  allowed  more grain to be shipped  to the
highest priced  market.  CRD5  switches and fully supplies Domestic Milling, freeing up CRDs  2 and 7
to supply PNW Korea.  As a result, the trader's  risk  in the Domestic Milling contract  decreases.
Standard  Deviation.  The standard  deviation also has a negative  effect  on the value of wheat
in CRD5 (Figure  4).  The  effects  of successive  increases  in the standard  duration  are fairly  constant
until it exceeds  3.0;  thereafter,  the  shadow price  stabilizes.  The  logic  is that, with increases  in the
higher  standard  deviation  for vomitoxin,  grain  from CRD5  presents greater risk to traders.  In
particular,  there  is a higher  probability of rejection  in higher-valued  markets.  Conversely,  when the
standard deviation  for  CRD5 is reduced  to zero, the objective function value increases (Table  8)  to
$1.22  billion.  This  implies that crop  value would  increase if there  were  no uncertainty  about the














0 2  4  6  8  10
Vomitoxin (ppm)
12
Figure 4.  Impact of CRD5 Vomitoxin Distribution on Shadow  Price (CRD5)
24Changes  in flows  to individual  markets  are also interesting.  With zero  standard deviation  for
vomitoxin  in  CRD5,  more grain  is shipped to PNW Korea, the higher  priced  market.  The  probability
of satisfying requirements  and coefficient  of variation for the PNW Korea contract  are about the same
as in the base  case; more  grain  is shipped with little change  in risk.  In the case of Domestic Milling,
shipment volumes are  reduced (slightly)  relative  to the base case,  but the coefficient  of variation  is
substantially lower.
In  both of these cases,  the marginal  value of wheat in  CRD5 increases relative to the base  case
(Table  9). A zero mean for vomitoxin  increases the CRD5 shadow price by  $0.63, while zero
uncertainty  (standard  deviation) increases  it by $0.47.  These values indicate  the premiums that would
have occurred  if there  had been  no vomitoxin in CRD5  or if traders had  perfect  information  about the
true  level of vomitoxin  in purchased  grain.  Shadow prices  for other regions are  also affected  by the
level  and standard  deviation of vomitoxin  in CRD5.  This reflects  changes in  blending opportunities
across  producing  regions  and changes  in aggregate  grain  flows.  The effects  are not uniform:  shadow
prices  rise in  some CRDs (e.g., 3 and 6) and fall  in others (1, 4,  7, and 8) when vomitoxin  in CRD5  is
eliminated.
These  results demonstrate how the value of wheat  is affected  by both the mean and variance  of
quality  characteristics.  Changes in  either can affect  the distribution  of flows,  prospective risks and
returns  from  shipping to different  markets.
Domestic  Milling  Strategies  Toward Vomitoxin.  There  are two important  strategic  aspects
to procurement.  One is the buyer's  bid price,  including (explicit or  implicit) discounts  for undesirable
characteristics.  The other  is the contract  requirement,  or specification.  In the case of the Domestic
Milling market,  selection of contract  requirements  for vomitoxin is somewhat constrained,  due to the
interpretation  of FDA  regulations.  Thus,  pricing  decisions  and  discount values for vomitoxin  are
critical  for this market segment.  Changes  in millers'  bids  and  discounts affect  the entire  system.
However,  here we focus on three variables:  the expected  value of vomitoxin  in shipments to Domestic
Milling, the probability  of satisfying requirements,  and aggregate  flows.
Discountingfor Vomitoxin:  These effects  were  evaluated by changing the discount for excess
vomitoxin  in the Domestic Milling market.19  As  expected, the value of the objective  function  rises as
the discount is reduced (Figure  5).  With no milling  discounts for vomitoxin  (DV=0),  the objective
function  reaches a value of  $1.249  billion (Table  8).
The  volume shipped to Domestic Milling is inversely related to the discount.  At low discount
levels,  Domestic Milling attracts  larger  flows  from regions  with higher vomitoxin  levels.  As the
milling discount increases,  more is shipped to PNW Other; curiously,  flows to PNW Korea decline
due to changing availabilities of high-quality  wheat  (Figure 6).
The  expected  level of vomitoxin received  by Domestic Milling is inversely  related to the
vomitoxin discount (Figure 7).  With zero  discount, the mean level  is 2.0 ppm, the constrained value.
The probability  of satisfying contract requirements  decreases  sharply and  traders'  risk  increases.  The
mean value  decreases rapidly until the discount reaches  $1.00;  thereafter,  it changes little.  These
19For this set of simulations  only, we vary the discount without  changing  any contract prices.  In  other
words, Dy  becomes  an explicit discount for Domestic Milling, no  longer simply the price  spread
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Figure  7.  Impacts of Domestic Miller's Vomitoxin  Discount on Vomitoxin  Level  and  Probability of
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-results show that discounts are a critical  variable  affecting  competition  between markets  and contracts.
With higher discounts, flows  to the Domestic Milling market are  reduced.  However,  the grain  shipped
is of higher  quality, with a greater  probability of conforming  to requirements.
Domestic Vomitoxin Specifications:  An  alternative  to changing  the discount is to adjust the
vomitoxin specification.  To evaluate  these effects,  the vomitoxin  specification  for Domestic Milling
was iterated  between  1.5  and  2.5 ppm.  Quantities shipped  to Domestic Milling decline  as the
specification  is tightened  and  increase as the specification  is relaxed.  (Figure  8.)
By tightening the specification,  Domestic Milling receives  a lower expected  level of vomitoxin.
For the entire  range  of vomitoxin  limits  (1.5  to 2.5 ppm),  the expected  value of vomitoxin  is always
less than the specified maximum.  In effect,  the discount for  excess vomitoxin causes traders to err on
the side of caution,  shipping lower mean  levels of vomitoxin than allowed  under the specification.  At
1.5 ppm,  the expected  level of vomitoxin is 0.82, with a probability of satisfying the requirements  of
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Figure  9.  Impacts of Miller's Vomitoxin Specification  on Vomitoxin  Level and  Probability
of Satisfying  Contract Requirement
Analysis of Importer Strategies.  In  some cases, importers  have more  latitude than
domestic  buyers  in their choice of specifications  and pricing  strategy.  The base case includes
drastically  different  prices  and contract  terms for different  buyers.  This  reflects  an important
dimension  of buyer competition:  in  spatially and quality differentiated  markets,  importers  compete
against each other and domestic buyers through price  and contract  specifications.
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A
-WAnalyses were  conducted  on these aspects of competition  in the PNW export  market.
Simulations  were conducted  using PNW Japan as an example  (though  equally interesting results could
be shown with other importers).  PNW Japan receives  no wheat in the base case,  either because  it
offers  too low a price or because  its specification  is too  restrictive.  The following  simulations
consider both possibilities.  To  simplify the analysis,  and to demonstrate more clearly the competition
between PNW and Minneapolis, we exclude PNW Korea from these simulations (by setting  its price to
zero).
Price Increase:  To attract  grain  to PNW Japan  without  changes in  specifications,  the price
must be raised to $6.04/b,  30 cents higher  than assumed  in the base case.  Figure  10  shows the effects
of successive price  increases on quantities shipped to different buyers.  Price  increases allow PNW
Japan  to bid wheat away from  Domestic Milling. Quantities received  by PNW Other show a moderate
increase,  for reasons having to do with changes in availabilities  and blending opportunities.
Figure  11  shows the mean level of vomitoxin shipped to PNW Japan  and the probability  of
satisfying  requirements  for a range  of contract  prices.  Vomitoxin  levels increase  with the contract
price,  and probabilities  decrease  moderately.  A higher premium  for PNW Japan over other contract
alternatives  induces larger  total shipments  and  expanded sourcing from  particular regions,  with some
reduction  in  average quality received.  However,  the mean vomitoxin level remains  well below the
specified  maximum,  0.5 ppm.
Vomitoxin  Specification:  From a buyer's perspective,  an alternative to changing  the price  is to
change  the contract  specification.  In the present context, that means relaxing the allowable  maximum
for vomitoxin  shipped to PNW Japan.  Figure  12  shows the effect  of different  contract limits on
aggregate  flows,  assuming a fixed contract  price for PNW Japan ($6/bu).  As the allowable maximum
increases  from  0.5  to 0.9 ppm,  PNW Japan is able to bid wheat  away from Domestic Milling just as  it
did by raising prices.  This reinforces the point that quality  specifications affect  spatial flows.
Figure  13  shows how relaxing  Japan's vomitoxin specification  affects qualities  received.  As
the allowable maximum  rises, so  does the mean  level of vomitoxin  in shipments to PNW Japan.
Probabilities  of acceptance  also increase  due to relaxation  of the vomitoxin constraint.
Efficacy  of Stringent Damage  Specifications  to Reduce Vomitoxin.  One  strategy pursued
by grain buyers  is to use contract  specifications for easily measured quality factors  as proxies  for
other,  less  easily measured  characteristics.  By tightening contract  limits for the easily measured  factor,
the buyer can  control  (indirectly)  expected levels of other factors.  Some buyers  use damage
specifications  to control the expected  level of vomitoxin, which  is rarely measured at country
elevators.  The  efficiency  of this depends  on the correlation  between these two variables  (r = 0.79  in
1993).
To  evaluate these effects,  the base  model was run with varying levels of damage  allowed for
PNW Other, a contract without a vomitoxin  limit.  Starting from  the base-case  limit of 4%, the
allowable  maximum was  reduced incrementally  to 2%.  Results demonstrate  that the expected  level  of
vomitoxin decreases with tighter specifications  on damage  (Figure  14).  This confirms  that the
expected  vomitoxin  level can be  controlled through tighter specifications  on other, more easily
measured characteristics  (damage  in this case).  However, this method  of control  is not perfect;  with
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Figure  11.  Impacts of Japan's Price  on Vomitoxin  Level  and Probability
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Figure  13.  Impacts of Japan's Vomitoxin Specification  on Vomitoxin  Level  and Probability of
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3.5More  interesting  are the changes in  aggregate  flows (Figure  15).  As PNW Other tightens its
damage  specification,  larger  flows  are attracted  to this contract,  and volumes shipped to premium
markets,  Domestic Milling, are reduced.  This  is a counterintuitive  result,  in sharp contrast  to that
described for  Japan in the preceding  section (where relaxation  of the vomitoxin  constraint induced
largersales volumes).  The logic runs as follows.  As  its specification  is tightened,  PNW Other can no
longer absorb  the same volume of high-damage  wheat.  This forces  some high-damage  (and high-
vomitoxin)  wheat into other market segments.  Such wheat  can be  sold in premium  markets (i.e.,
Domestic Milling and PNW Korea) after appropriate  blending,  but average quality  in those markets
will decline.  In fact,  expected vomitoxin levels  increase  in shipments to premium  markets as PNW
Other tightens its damage  specification (Table  8).  With fixed  contract  prices, this reduces  the
probability  of satisfying requirements  and  hence the expected  price received  in premium  markets.  As
a result, prices received  in PNW Other become more attractive  in relative terms,  inducing larger  sales.
In  practice,  changes  in specifications  by one buyer  may lead to changes  by other buyers.
Thus, tightening  of specifications  by PNW Other, and the consequent redirection  of high-damage  grain
to other market channels,  could induce changes  in bid prices or quality discounts by premium  markets.
Such interactions  are  not captured  in  our model,  although  the results do suggest different  possible
forms  of strategic  response.
SUMMARY  AND  DISCUSSION
Quality  variability  is a major concern  of grain importers  and  domestic processors  and,
consequently,  has  implications for merchandisers  and farmers.  For spring-planted  grains  in North
America, the  importance of quality variability was heightened  in  1993  and  1994.  Untimely  rains in
those years  increased  the level and variability of vomitoxin.  This is an  undesirable characteristic
subject to food  safety  concerns and regulations and has been cited as a problem in  both domestic and
world market  channels.
Characteristics  like vomitoxin  are not easily controllable  through  contracts,  due to sampling
difficulties  (and  expense)  and measurement  error.  As a result, traders  and end-users  can be exposed to
significant  quality risks.  These types of problems  are found  in wheat,  barley  and corn (aflatoxin).
Confronted  with severe  quality uncertainty,  grain  markets  can respond in  several ways.  Large
premiums  and discounts  can emerge, having the effect of disrupting  normal  spatial flows.  In the case
of vomitoxin  in  spring wheat,  some importers responded  by a tightening  of contract  specifications  or
by offering  premiums for  shipments with reduced  vomitoxin.  Domestic processors,  in  competition
with importers,  responded  similarly.  In this trading  environment,  merchandisers  confront several
sources of risk.  One  is the risk of not being  able to meet  specifications  and  having to sell at a
discount (i.e.,  in a secondary market).  The other is the risk of paying too high a price for wheat based
on false expectations.  In  1993,  farmers  expressed concerns  about  large discounts for damaged  or
infected  wheat delivered  to country elevators.
We  developed a mathematical  programming  model to analyze  this problem.  The model
incorporates  spatial dimensions of quality distributions,  competing  geographic  market demands,  and
contract requirements  and prices  for specific buyers.  One of the important features  is that probabilities
(i.e.,  of satisfying constraints for vomitoxin)  are endogenous;  implicitly, they reflect  price  signals
33received  by traders.  The model was used to evaluate the effect  of quality distributions  and alternative
buyer  strategies on spatial  flows  and grain  values in country  locations.
Simulations were  conducted using market  data and grain quality distributions  for  1993  (the
base case)  and  1994.  For illustration,  we varied the  level and standard deviation  of vomitoxin  and
simulated different  procurement  strategies (prices  and contract  specifications)  by principal  buyers  of
spring  wheat.  Following are  some of the important results  and  implications:
Flows  in the base  case (1993)  are primarily  to the Domestic Milling market  and to the
PNW Other and PNW Korea contracts.  Flows to Japan  are nil due to abnormally tight
specifications  on vomitoxin relative to supply and  competing  contracts.  Shadow
prices varied  substantially  across contiguous regions,  reflecting  differences  in the level
and variance  of vomitoxin and other characteristics.  An additional  simulation was
performed  for the  1994 crop  year;  flows and  shadow prices varied  substantially from
the base case.
*  The model was used to evaluate the relative importance  of the mean  level  and variance
of vomitoxin on shadow  prices of wheat in  a particular  producing region  (CRD5).
Results demonstrate that increases  in  either the mean  level or variance  have a negative
effect on prices.  Thus, merchandisers,  farmers  and breeders should  be concerned  with
both the mean value of an undesirable  characteristic  and with its variance.
*  Buyers'  procurement  strategies are  reflected  in contract  specifications  and in the use of
premiums  and  discounts for particular  quality characteristics.  In evaluating  these
alternatives,  buyers  have to be cognizant of the  spatial dimension  of competition  and
competition  from  other buyers.  Specifying  abnormally tight requirements,  not matched
by competing  contracts,  reduces the geographical  region  in which  a buyer  is
competitive.  However,  in the context  of our model,  with multiple quality factors  and
competing  contracts, the effects of contract  tightening are not always easy to
anticipate.  For example,  by reducing the allowable  limit for damage  in one contract
(PNW Other), we induced  larger  sales under this contract  at the expense of sales to
other,  premium  buyers.
The results illustrate complex  interactions among prices, contract  specifications,  merchandising
risks,  and the importance  of having secondary  contracts  in quality-differentiated  markets.  These
features  of the marketing  environment  are critical  to merchandising decisions and to an informed
understanding  of spatial  flows  and quality-related  price  spreads.
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